

Supply, Demand, and Specialized Production

Discussion of Hamilton

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on October 29, 2021

Introduction

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- * This paper
 - * perhaps more ideas than the optimal amount
 - * still, a paper I would want to have written

Discussion

- * Key Idea:
 - * adjustment to sectoral demand shocks
 - * world with special inputs:
 - * sunk, specialized, and market power
 - * adjustment will be inefficient: lead to underutilization
- * My Discussion:
 - * present simplified model
 - * what assumptions are needed
 - * connect with some classical and recent literature
- * Paper has more to say: growth, product entry, inequality
 - * explain why model naturally connects to these ideas...
 - * but focus on the core

Hamilton-ish Model: Environment

- * representative household
 - * complete market: no risk, no inequality
- * j sectors
- * one unit of labor
 - * n_j supply of sector j work
 - * allocated in advance

Hamilton-ish Model - Production

* n_j pre-determined

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$$y_j = u_j n_j$$

where $u_j \in [0, 1]$

- * j workers form a coalition
 - * choose price p_j
 - * maximizes revenues R_j

$$w_j = R_j / n_j$$

- * important: u_j endogenous under-capacity

Static Block: Sectoral Consumption Choice

* Consumption choice:

$$C = \max_{\{c_j\}} \left(\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \left(\alpha_{j,t}^{1/\sigma} (c_j + \bar{y}_j)^{1-1/\sigma} \right) \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

subject to:

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} p_j \cdot c_j = e \equiv \text{expenditures.}$$

Static Block: Transformed problem

* Define $x_j \equiv c_j + \bar{y}_j$ so that:

$$C = \max_{\{x_j \geq \bar{y}_j\}} \left(\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \left(\alpha_j^{1/\sigma} (x_j)^{1-1/\sigma} \right) \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

subject to:

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} p_j \cdot x_j = \bar{e} \equiv \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} R_j + \underbrace{p_j \bar{y}_j}_{\text{threat}}$$

Static Block: Product Demand

* Usual CES solution:

$$x_j = \left(\frac{p_j}{P} \right)^{-\sigma} \alpha_j C$$

Static Block: Product Demand

- * Usual CES solution:

$$x_j = \left(\frac{p_j}{P} \right)^{-\sigma} \alpha_j C$$

- * Apply definition:

$$c_j = \left(\frac{p_j}{P} \right)^{-\sigma} \alpha_j C - \underbrace{\bar{y}_j}_{\text{threat}}.$$

Union Problem

* Revenue:

$$R_j = \max_{p_j} p_j \cdot c_j(p_j)$$

subject to capacity constraint:

$$p_j > \bar{p}_j$$

Union Problem

* Replacing demand function:

$$R_j = \max_{p_j} p_j \underbrace{\left(\frac{p_j}{P}\right)^{-\sigma} \alpha_j C - p_j \bar{y}_j}_{c_j(p_j)}$$

subject to:

$$p_j > \bar{p}_j$$

where \bar{p}_j

$$\underbrace{n_j}_{\text{maximal output}} = \left(\frac{\bar{p}_j}{P}\right)^{-\sigma} \alpha_j C - \bar{y}_j$$

Solution

- * FOC:

$$(1 - \sigma) \left(\frac{p_j}{P} \right)^{-\sigma} \alpha_j C - \bar{y}_j = 0$$

- * Critical: bliss point
 - * why? marginal cost is zero
- * Critical: $\sigma < 1$ and
 - * why? otherwise no output

After some algebra...

- * Sectoral output:

$$y_j = \min \left\{ \underbrace{n_j}_{\text{binding}}, \underbrace{\frac{\sigma}{(1-\sigma)} \bar{y}_j}_{\text{non binding}} \right\}$$

- * Revenues:

$$R_j = \min \left\{ \underbrace{\quad}_{\text{binding}}, \underbrace{\quad}_{\text{non binding}} \right\} (\alpha_{j,t} C)^{1/\sigma}$$

- * Binding: Walrasian wage
- * Non-binding: excess supply monopoly pricing

Symmetric Case

- * Aggregate output:

$$C = \min \left\{ \underbrace{n + \bar{y}}_{\text{binding}}, \underbrace{\frac{\bar{y}}{(1 - \sigma)}}_{\text{non binding}} \right\}$$

- * If n grows: output remains fixed!
- * Possibly binding at steady-state:
 - * under-utilization of factors
 - * this is why variety is interesting? Bilbie, Ghironi, and Melitz

Aggregate Demand Shocks?

- * Patience shock:

$$1 = \beta (t) \frac{U'(C_{t+1})}{U'(C_t)} \mathcal{R}_t$$

- * Output is supply determined
 - * Does not affect under utilization!
- * Important: think of sectoral shocks

Dynamics: Sectoral Shocks

- * Lucas-Prescott Island Model (Alvarez-Shimer)
 - * worker ex-ante choice of j island
 - * assumption: union cannot reject worker
 - * Training, skill monopoly?
 - * Firm-market power?
 - * Connect with Caballero Hammour

Dynamics: Sectoral Shocks

- * Lucas-Prescott Island Model (Alvarez-Shimer)

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- * Idea:

- * $\alpha \in \{\alpha^L, \alpha^H\}$ Markov switching intensity θ
- * work value function:

$$\rho v(n, \alpha) = \frac{R(\alpha, n; C)}{n} + \theta \underbrace{\mathbb{J}[v(n, \alpha') | \alpha]}_{\text{shock}}.$$

- * Unemployment island:

- * stuck for τ periods: then choose where to go

$$\rho \mathcal{V} = \underbrace{\exp(-\rho\tau)}_{\text{wait}} \max_{\alpha} \{v(n(\alpha), \alpha)\}.$$

Two Shock Example

- * Two capacities: $\{n^l, n^h\}$
 - * Unemployment Rate:

$$u = \tau \cdot \theta \cdot (n^h - n^l)$$

- * Equilibrium Condition

$$\underbrace{v(\alpha^L) = \mathcal{U}}_{\text{adjustment indiff}} = \exp(-\rho\tau) v(\alpha^H).$$

Solution

* Labor flows:

$$1 = n^h + \underbrace{\tau \cdot \theta \cdot (n^h - n^l)}_{\text{unemployment}} + n^l$$

and indifference:

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and indifference:

$$v(\alpha^l, n^l) = \exp(-\rho\tau) v(\alpha^h, n^h)$$

* Recall:

$$\rho v(\alpha, n) = \frac{R(\alpha, n; C)}{n} + \theta (v(\alpha', n') - v(\alpha, n))$$

Paper Pencil Case

* Assume $\theta = \rho$ and $\sigma = \bar{y} = 1/2$ and $\tau = 1$

Solution:

- * Resource Constraint


$$1 = n^h + \underbrace{\tau \cdot \theta \cdot (n^h - n^l)}_{\text{unemployment}} + n^l.$$

- * Indifference Condition

$$\left(\frac{\exp(\rho) - 1/2}{1 - \exp(\rho)/2} \right)^2 \underbrace{\frac{1}{\bar{y} + n^l}}_{\text{non-binding}} = \underbrace{\frac{\bar{y}}{n^{h2}}}_{\text{binding}} \frac{\alpha^h}{\alpha^l}$$

- * Possibly no solution

One Picture



Various Degrees of High Demand

Characterization:

- * Equilibrium must feature:
 - * (too little) unemployment | reallocation..
 - * ...but under-utilization in high-demand sector
- * frictionless economy: wage would absorb the cost
 - * not here
- * Dynamics: very interesting but left out!

Conclusion

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- * Very nice paper!
- * Lot to think about!